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Abstract. Choosing the best out of an increasing number of options re-
quires reliable and accurate information. As our time and resources are
limited, we commonly use the experience of others in order to take de-
cisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback
collected from peers and compute the “reputation” of products, services,
or providers. They enjoy huge success and are believed to be the key of
the agent mediated commerce of tomorrow.
Obtaining honest feedback from self-interested agents is not a trivial
problem. Mechanisms based on side-payments can be conceived such
that honest reporting becomes rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortu-
nately, for every incentive-compatible Nash equilibrium there seems to
also be a dishonest Nash equilibrium strategy that sometimes is more
attractive. In this paper we analyze two incentive-compatible reputation
mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be
eliminated by using trusted (i.e. true) reports.
1 Introduction
In a world that offers an ever increasing number of options, having the informa-
tion to make the right choices becomes of vital importance. The internet, and
advances in communication technologies have made raw data readily available
anytime, anywhere. It is trivial today to get extensive technical descriptions of
computers, TV-sets, or any other products you might want to buy. Comparative
charts between similar products of different brands are a few more mouse-clicks
away, however, making sense of all this data still requires intensive human effort.
The usefulness of increasing amounts of data is thus limited by the processing
capacity of the human brain and by the available physical time. Moreover, even
the most detailed technical charts cannot answer crucial questions like: “How
useful or reliable is this product?” or “How well does the manufacturer fulfill its
promises?” in terms of product quality and customer support.
It is therefore common practice to draw on the experience of peers in order
to make decisions. Aggregated feedback coming from previous users constitutes
the reputation of a product, service or manufacturer. Reputation information
accounts for the data we cannot directly observe before the purchase (e.g. relia-
bility of the product/manufacturer, overall quality, hidden aspects, etc) and also
allows to reuse the effort spent by previous buyers in collecting and analyzing
available data. Moreover, by making reputation information machine-readable
(through clear syntax and semantics) it can also be used by software agents in
the automated e-market of tomorrow.
Reputation Mechanisms (RM) are responsible for collecting and aggregating
feedback. They enjoy huge success and have become a mandatory component of
every online market. Early implementers (e.g. eBay1 or Amazon2) owe part of
their success to such “feedback forums” which make it very easy for subsequent
buyers to assess the trustworthiness/quality of a seller or book. Studies show that
buyers seriously take into account the reputation of the seller when placing their
bids in online auctions [9] and that despite the incentive to free ride, feedback is
provided in more than half of the transactions on eBay [16].
Obtaining honest feedback from agents is not a trivial problem. Rational
agents report according to their selfish interests. For example, disclosing the
genuine positive experience with a scarce service or product is never rational.
The resulting increase in reputation will attract more consumers and therefore
less availability for the reporter in the future: e.g. smart parents do not disclose
the name of their favorite babysitter [5].
As a consequence, RM have to provide the right incentives in order to con-
vince rational agents to report the truth (incentive-compatibility). One way to
do it is to pay for feedback reports according to their estimated truthfulness.
Since verification authorities are usually not available, the truthfulness of a re-
port is assessed by comparing it with reports coming from other agents about
the same service or service provider.3 It turns out that if there is sufficient cor-
relation between reports, there exist payment rules that make truthful reporting
a Nash Equilibrium (i.e. rational agents report the truth given that all other
agents report the truth).
The basic idea behind this class of incentive-compatible reputation mecha-
nisms can be grasped by considering the example of a webservice that is sequen-
tially invoked by a set of users. Despite the best intention of the owning company,
there is some fixed probability that the service invocation fails. Feedback reports
about such a webservice are binary values, (i.e. the invocation failed or not) and
the reputation of the webservice will estimate its failure rate. Since all feedback
reports refer to the same random event, there is some degree of correlation be-
tween them. Future reports (assuming that they are true) can give information
about the honesty of the present report. Side payments considering this infor-
mation, can make it rational for agents to report the truth. Consequently, the
1 www.ebay.com
2 www.amazon.com
3 The term “service” is used generically and can stand for any product (e.g. book) or
service (e.g. web-hosting). Likewise, the “service provider” will stand for the entity
providing the service (e.g. the author of the book, the ISP providing the web-hosting
service)
system has a Nash equilibrium incentive compatible equilibrium point. [15] and
[10] describe such concrete mechanisms.
Unfortunately, such mechanisms typically have multiple Nash equilibrium
points. Taking the example from the previous paragraph, always reporting pos-
itive feedback is also a Nash Equilibrium strategy. For example, 99.1% of the
feedback submitted on eBay is positive [7]. From a game theoretic point of view
this might be regarded as evidence for the existence of a cooperative Nash equilib-
rium of the repeated trading game [8]. However, it can also be the manifestation
of a Nash equilibrium reporting strategy in which every agent reports positive
feedback.
Moreover, the incentive compatible equilibrium payoff is often dominated
by some other Nash equilibrium payoff. Whenever an agent truthfully reports
negative feedback, it risks retaliation from the subject of the report. On eBay,
a negative report submitted by a buyer about a transaction is often followed by
a negative report submitted by the seller about the buyer. Therefore, it is more
profitable to adopt an equilibrium point where you only report positive reports
rather than true reports. The mechanisms described in [15] and [10] suffer from
the same drawback.
Finally, the existence of multiple equilibrium points is a serious impediment
for the engineering of reputation mechanisms in real application. The behavior of
such mechanisms can be very chaotic, and there is no guarantee that the agents
will choose exactly the incentive compatible strategy over one of the many other
dishonest equilibrium strategies.
Trusted reports (verifiable reports coming from independent authorities) can
be used to eliminate the undesired Nash equilibrium points. In the extreme
case in which the feedback provided by agents is compared only against trusted
(i.e. true) reports, the incentive compatible Nash equilibrium becomes unique.
However, in most cases it is enough to have trusted reports for comparison, only
with a certain probability. Since trusted reports are expensive, it is interesting
to determine how small this probability can be.
In this paper we investigate the influence of trusted reports on the set of equi-
librium points of the reputation mechanisms described in [15] and [10]. While
the specific results of this paper are only applicable to the two mechanisms
mentioned above, this paper introduces a general methodology for studying the
influence of trusted reports on the equilibrium points of a reputation mechanism.
Section 2 introduces the setting and explains the functioning of the two mech-
anisms. Section 3 analysis the Nash equilibrium points of the mechanisms and
analytically shows how trusted reports can be used to eliminate the undesired
equilibria. Numerical results are presented and interpreted in Section 4, followed
by related work and a conclusion.
2 The Setting
In this section we present in detail the two reputation mechanisms that will be
analyzed in the rest of the paper. The two mechanisms have been named after
the initials of their authors: i.e. The MRZ mechanism denotes the mechanism de-
scribed by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhouser in [15] and the JF mechanism denotes
the mechanism described by Jurca and Faltings in [10].
2.1 The MRZ Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanism
In [15], Miller et al. consider that a number of agents sequentially experience the
same service whose type4 is drawn from a set of possible types T .5
The real type of the service does not change during the experiment, and is
not known by the agents. However, after every interaction, the agent receives
one signal s (from a possible set of signals S of cardinality M) about the type of
the service. For a certain product type t ∈ T , the signals perceived by the agents
are independently identically distributed such that the signal si is observed with
probability f(si|t) for all si ∈ S.
∑
si∈S f(si|t) = 1 for all t ∈ T .
After every interaction, the participating agent is asked to submit feedback
about the signal she has observed. The reputation mechanism collects the re-
ports, and updates the reputation of the product. Reputation information con-
sists of the probability distribution over the possible types of the service. Let p
be the current belief of the reputation mechanism (and therefore of all agents
that can access the reputation information) about the probability distribution
over types of the service. p(t) is the probability assigned by the current belief to
the fact that the service is of type t, and
∑
t∈T p(t) = 1. When the reputation
mechanisms receives a report r ∈ S, the belief p is updated using Bayes’ Law:
p(t|r) = f(r|t) · p(t)
Pr[r]
where Pr[r] =
∑
t∈T f(r|t) · p(t) is the probability of observing the signal r.
Each feedback report is compared against another future report. Let r ∈ S
be the report submitted by agent a and let rr be the future report submitted
by agent ar which serves to assess the honesty of r. The agent ar is called the
rater of the agent a since the report rr is used to “rate” the report r. Typically,
the next report is used to evaluate the present one. Miller et al. show that if
agent a is paid according to the scoring rule R(rr, r), she will honestly report
her observation given that ar also honestly reports his observation. The three
best known scoring rules are:
1. Quadratic Scoring Rule: R(rr, r) = 2Pr[rr|r]−
∑
sh∈S Pr[sh|r]2
4 The type of a service defines the totality of relevant characteristics of that service.
For example, quality, and possibly other attributes define the type of a product.
5 The set of possible types is the combination of all values of the attributes which define
the type. While this definition generates an infinite-size set of types, in most practical
situations, approximations make the set of possible types countable. For example,
the set of possible types could have only two elements: good and bad. This implies
that there is common understanding among the agents in the environment that the
service can be exhaustively classified as good or bad: i.e. no other information about
the service is relevant for the decision taken by the agents in that environment.
2. Spherical Scoring Rule: R(rr, r) =
Pr[rr|r](∑
sh∈S Pr[sh|r]2
)1/2
3. Logarithmic Scoring Rule: R(rr, r) = lnPr[rr|r]
where Pr[sh|r] =
∑
t∈T f(sh|t) ·p(t|r) is the posterior probability that the signal
sh will be observed, as known by the reputation mechanism immediately after r
has been reported.
To illustrate how this mechanism works, let us consider that a service can
have two possible types, i.e., good (G) or bad (B). Buyers can observe two signals,
+ or − such that the distribution of signals conditional of the type of the service
is: f(+|G) = 0.9, f(−|G) = 0.1, f(+|B) = 0.15, f(−|B) = 0.85. Let us assume
that the current belief about the type of the service assigns probability 0.4 to
the service being good and 0.6 to the service being bad. i.e. p(G) = 0.4 and
p(B) = 0.6.
Let us assume that the agent a has the next interaction with the service, and
that she has observed a +. Figure 1 shows how the side-payments are computed,
and how beliefs are updated if a reports + or −.
Given that ar reports the truth, a maximizes her expected payoff by also
reporting the truth. The same would be true if a had observed a − rather than a
+. Miller et al. show that in every situation (for every signal observed, for every
belief about the service, and for all generic distributions of signals conditional
on types) it is better for a to report the truth, given that ar also reports the
truth. Honest reporting is therefore a Nash equilibrium.
However, there are also other Nash equilibrium strategies that are not incentive-
compatible. Examples of such strategies will be presented in Section 3.1.
2.2 The JF Incentive-Compatible Reputation Mechanism
The MRZ mechanism can be easily adapted to a variety of contexts. However,
it assumes (1) common knowledge about the distribution of signals conditional
on types and (2) lack of private information.
Since the MRZ mechanism is based on side-payments which are computed
using scoring rules, the agents always have the incentive to approximate as good
as possible the signal that will be observed by the rater. When the two assump-
tion above are satisfied, the incentive to provide the best approximation for
the signal received by the rater coincides with honestly reporting the observed
signal. However, when the reporting agent and the reputation mechanism have
different views of the world (i.e. different beliefs about the service), the agent
can manipulate her report depending on her private beliefs (about the service
and about the beliefs of the reputation mechanism).
The JF mechanism eliminates this drawback at the expense of limiting the
contexts in which the incentive-compatible property holds. The model used by
Jurca and Faltings in [10] is that of a service having a “dynamic type”. The
signals perceived by the agents do not only depend on the type of the service,
but also on temporary information. The model adopted for the probability dis-
tribution of signals is that of a Markov chain of variable length, and the possible
set of signals consist of only two values + and −.
a reports + a reports −
Beliefs of a regarding the posterior distribution over types
p(G|+) =
f(+|G) · p(G)
f(+|G) · p(G) + f(+|B) · p(B)
= 0.8;
p(B|+) = 1 − p(G|+) = 0.2
Beliefs of the Reputation Mechanism regarding the posterior distribution over types
p(G|+) =
f(+|G) · p(G)
f(+|G) · p(G) + f(+|B) · p(B)
= 0.8;
p(B|+) = 1 − p(G|+) = 0.2
p(G|−) =
f(−|G) · p(G)
f(−|G) · p(G) + f(−|B) · p(B)
= 0.07;
p(B|−) = 1 − p(G|−) = 0.93
Beliefs of a regarding the distribution of signals received by ar
Pr[+|+] = f(+|G) · p(G|+) + f(+|B) · p(B|+) = 0.75
Pr[−|+] = 1 − Pr[+|+] = 0.25
Beliefs of the Reputation Mechanism regarding the distribution of signals received by ar
Pr[+|+] = f(+|G) · p(G|+) + f(+|B) · p(B|+) = 0.75
Pr[−|+] = 1 − Pr[+|+] = 0.25
Pr[+|−] = f(+|G) · p(G|−) + f(+|B) · p(B|−) = 0.2
Pr[−|−] = 1 − Pr[+|−] = 0.8
Payment made to a (Using spherical scoring rule)
R(+,+) = Pr[+|+]√
Pr[+|+]2+Pr[−|+]2
= 0.95 if rr = +
R(−,+) = Pr[−|+]√
Pr[+|+]2+Pr[−|+]2
= 0.32 if rr = −.
R(+,−) = Pr[+|−]√
Pr[+|−]2+Pr[−|−]2
= 0.24 if rr = +
R(−,−) = Pr[−|−]√
Pr[+|−]2+Pr[−|−]2
= 0.97 if rr = −.
Expected payment to a
Esj∈{+,−}
[
R(sj |+)
]
= Pr[+|+] · R(+,+)
+ Pr[−|+] · R(−,+) = 0.79
Esj∈{+,−}
[
R(sj |−)
]
= Pr[+|+] · R(+,−)
+ Pr[−|+] · R(−,−) = 0.42
Fig. 1. Updating of beliefs, and computation of side payments according to the MRZ
mechanism, given that a has observed a +.
The side-payment for reports follows a very simple rule, and does not depend
on the beliefs of the agent or of the reputation mechanism. A report is paid only
if the next report submitted about the same service has the same value. The
amount of the payment is dynamically scaled such that the whole mechanism is
budget-balanced.
The Markov model for the observable signals is very appropriate for services
offered by software agents. Let us recall the service used in section 2.1, and let us
also consider that the service is provided by a software agent (i.e. a webservice).
One possibility is to consider that the webservice is always providing the same
service (good or bad) and that the agents perceive the signals + and − with the
probabilities: f(+|G), f(−|G), f(+|B) and f(−|B). However, if the good and
bad types are interpreted as successful, respectively defective service (and the +
and − signals are interpreted as satisfactory, respectively unsatisfactory answers,
perceived with some inherent noise) it is more realistic to assume that failures
are correlated. Intuitively, the failure of the present invocation is an indication
of exceptional conditions (hardware failure, blocks in the software, overload,
etc) and therefore is likely to influence the result of the next invocation. For
example, a failure of the present invocation due to hardware problems indicates
a big probability of failure for the next invocation as well. On the contrary,
present failure due to an overload might indicate a bigger probability of success
for the next invocation.
While the MRZ mechanism can easily be adapted for Markov models of
behavior, it requires that the model be common knowledge among the agents:
i.e. all agents must agree on the length of the model and on the fact that there is
a unique set of parameters characterizing that model. By having side-payments
that do not depend on the beliefs of the agents, the JF mechanism allows the
agents to have any private beliefs about the model of the webservice, as long as
these beliefs satisfy some general constraints. Of course, the freedom of having
private beliefs is paid by the constraints which must be satisfied, that limit the
contexts in which incentive-compatibility is guaranteed.
3 Eliminating Undesired Equilibrium Points
3.1 Nash Equilibria of the original mechanisms
Formally, a pure reporting strategy of an agent a is a mapping σ : S → S
such that σ(si) ∈ S is the signal reported by a when she observes the signal si.
Similarly, a mixed reporting strategy is a mapping from the set of signals S to
the set of all probabilistic combinations of signals from S. σ(si) =
∑
j∈S α
i
jsj
denotes that sj is reported with probability αij given that the signal observed
by a was si.
∑M
j=1 α
i
j = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
The incentive compatible strategy is denoted by σ∗ such that σ∗(si) = si
for all si ∈ S. By an abuse of notation we also use sj to denote the “constant”
reporting strategy: sj(si) = sj for all si ∈ S.
Given that a uses reporting strategy σ and that the rater of a (i.e. ar) uses
reporting strategy σ′ = (βij), the expected payment of a when observing the
signal si is:
E[σ, σ′, si] =
M∑
j=1
αij
( M∑
k=1
Pr[sk|si] ·
( M∑
l=1
βkl ·R(sl, sj)
))
;
where:
– Pr[sk|si] is the probability that the rater observes the signal sk given that
a has observed si,
– the function R(sl, sj) gives the payment made by the reputation mechanism
to a if a reports the signal sj and ar reports the signal sl.
For the MRZ mechanism the function R(sl, sj) is defined by one of the scoring
rules presented in section 2.1. For the JF mechanism, the function R(sl, sj) is 1
if sl = sj and 0 otherwise.
A strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium strategy if and only if for all observable
signals si, the agent a does not have the incentive to deviate from σ given that
the rater also uses the reporting strategy σ:
E[σ, σ, si] ≥ E[σ′, σ, si] for all si ∈ S, σ′ 6= σ; (1)
The MRZ mechanism generally has many Nash equilibrium strategies. Taking
again the example in Figure 1, the reporting strategy + (i.e. always reporting
+) is also a Nash equilibrium: given that ar reports +, it is best for a to also
report + since R(+,+) = 0.95 > R(+,−) = 0.24. Moreover, the expected payoff
to a from the reporting strategy + is greater than the expected payoff of the
incentive-compatible strategy (0.95 > 0.79).
The JF mechanism suffers from the same drawback. Reporting only +, re-
porting only − or always reporting the opposite signal are all Nash equilibrium
strategies that generate higher payoffs that the incentive-compatible strategy.
3.2 The influence of trusted reports
For all incentive compatible reputation mechanisms, the truthful reporting strat-
egy σ∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium. When the report submitted by the rater is
always a trusted report, the expected payment received by a, given that she has
observed the signal si and uses the reporting strategy σ is E[σ, σ∗, si]. As the
rater’s strategy is fixed, the only Nash equilibrium strategy of a is the truthful
reporting strategy σ∗. Any other reporting strategy will generate a strictly lower
payoff (Equation 1).
Since trusted reports are expensive, it is interesting to see if undesired Nash
equilibrium points can be eliminated by using only a probabilistic comparison
with a trusted report. Let q be the probability that the report of the rater is
a trusted one. The expected payoff to a from the equilibrium strategy σ, given
that she has observed the signal si is then:
Eq[σ, σ, si] = q · E[σ, σ∗, si] + (1− q) · E[σ, σ, si]
The strategy σ continues to be a Nash equilibrium strategy if and only if for
all other reporting strategies σ′, Eq[σ′, σ, si] < Eq[σ, σ, si], for all signals si.
Finding the minimum probability q such that the incentive-compatible re-
porting strategy remains the only Nash equilibrium strategy of the mechanism
involves solving the following problem:
Problem 1. Find q∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all q, q∗ ≤ q ≤ 1, for all report-
ing strategies σ 6= σ∗, there is a signal si and a strategy σ′ 6= σ such that
Eq[σ, σ, si] < Eq[σ′, σ, si].
In other words, Problem 1 implies finding the minimum probability with
which the rater’s report has to be true (i.e. trusted) such that for all reporting
strategies σ, there is at least one profitable deviation (defined by the strategy
σ′) for at least one of the observable signals.
Problem 1 is very hard to solve for the general case, and the result is also very
restrictive. A relaxation would be to eliminate only those equilibrium strategies
that generate a higher payoff than the incentive compatible strategy. The prac-
tical justification for this relaxation is that rational agents always choose from
a set of possible equilibrium strategies the one which generates the highest pay-
off. Therefore, given that truthful reporting yields the highest payoff, we argue
that it is not necessary from a practical perspective to eliminate all other Nash
equilibrium points.
Finding the minimum probability such that the incentive-compatible report-
ing strategy generates the highest payoff implies solving the following problem:
Problem 2. Find q∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all q, q∗ ≤ q ≤ 1, for all Nash equi-
librium reporting strategies σ 6= σ∗, Eq[σ, σ, si] < Eq[σ∗, σ∗, si], for all si ∈ S.
which can be reformulated as the following optimization problem:
Problem 3. Minimize: q
Under the constraint : f(q) ≥ 0;
Where f(q) is itself the optimization problem:
Maximize: f(q) = Eq[σ, σ, si]− E[σ∗, σ∗, si]
Under NE constr.: Eq[σ, σ, sk] ≥ Eq[sj , σ, sk] for all sj , sk ∈ S.
The above optimization problem involves solving two nested optimizations:
(1) finding the Nash equilibrium strategy that generates the highest payoff, and
(2) finding the minimum value of q (i.e. q∗) for which the highest Nash equilib-
rium payoff corresponds to the incentive-compatible reporting strategy. Finding
the highest Nash equilibrium payoff is a NP-hard problem [4]. The function f(q),
on the other hand, is increasing in q and therefore a binary search can be used
to find the minimum value of q. Please note that the solutions to problem 3 also
represent lower bounds for the solutions of problem 1.
The threshold value q∗ for the probability that the report of the rater needs
to be trusted is not necessarily the overall percentage of trusted reports needed
by the reputation mechanism.
The structure of the MRZ mechanism allows to reuse trusted reports. The
same rater (and report) can be used to assess the honesty of more than one
feedback. In extremis, one could imagine that a trusted report is used to assess
all other reports collected by the reputation mechanism. The actual percentage
of trusted reports needed by the mechanism is hence very low and is equal to
the value of q∗ divided by the total number of reports which are rated against
the same trusted report.
Rating more reports against the same trusted report poses however, some
problems. The evaluation of the reports has to be done in the same time, after
all reports have been submitted. The bigger the number of reports that are
scored against the same trusted report, the smaller the overall percentage of
trusted reports needed, but also the bigger the waiting time for the reputation
side-payment. When agents discount future payoffs, the maximum waiting time
becomes bounded (bigger waiting time will cancel the incentives to report the
truth due to the discount factor).
Moreover, in a dynamic system (i.e. the type of the service might change
in time), the trusted report could become outdated. Thus, a compromise needs
to be reached between an increased cost due to higher percentage of trusted
reports and a bigger risk of loosing the incentives to report the truth due to
waiting times and outdated reports used for rating.
The JF mechanism, on the other hand requires a fresh rater for every sub-
mitted report (i.e. the report of the next agent is always used to rate the present
feedback). Therefore, the threshold value q∗ becomes the overall percentage of
trusted reports needed by the reputation mechanism.
4 Numerical Analysis
In this section we numerically analyze the influence of trusted reports for a series
of scenarios which are likely to appear in real reputation systems. For each such
scenario we will present the numerical solution of the optimization problem 3,
representing the threshold value (q∗) for the probability that the rater needs to
provide a trusted report.
For the JF mechanism there is a closed form solution to the optimization
problem 3:
q ≥ q∗ = max
(
1− Pr[−|−]
Pr[−|−] ,
1− Pr[+|+]
Pr[+|+]
)
;
As the probabilities Pr[−|−] and Pr[+|+] vary in the interval [0.5, 1] (smaller
values for Pr[−|−] or Pr[+|+] are not allowed by the assumptions of the JF
mechanism), q∗ takes values in the interval [0, 1].
The threshold value (i.e. q∗) approaches 0 when both probabilities Pr[+|+]
and Pr[−|−] approach 1. This scenario appears when the behavior of the provider
in successive transactions is highly correlated. In such cases, there is little un-
certainty about the signal observed by the rater, and therefore the incentive-
compatible strategy of the JF mechanism yields payoffs which approach the
maximum possible payoff.
For the MRZ mechanism we investigate settings with N possible types and
N possible signals received by the agents. We considered that each signal corre-
sponds to one type, and that there is uniform noise in the observation of signals.
Let si be the signal corresponding to the type ti. The probability distribution
of signals conditioned on the type ti is:
f(sj |ti) =

1− δ if sj = si
δ
N − 1 if sj 6= si
where δ is the “level” of noise, typically, δ = 10%.
For N = 2, Figure 2 plots the threshold value q∗ for all possible beliefs of the
agents. Having only 2 types for the service (i.e. good and bad) the probability
of the type being good (the value on the horizontal axis) completely describes a
belief.
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Fig. 2. Threshold value q∗ for the MRZ mechanism, when N = 2 and δ = 10%.
From Figure 2 one can see that the report of the rater has to be trusted with
a probability between 60 and 80 percent. The gaps at both ends of the interval
are explained by the “activation” of previously inefficient reporting strategies.
When the probability of the type G is close to one, the constant reporting strat-
egy − is very inefficient. The Pr[−|−] has a very small value, which plugged
into the formula of any of the scoring rules presented in Section 2.1 yields a
very small payoff. Therefore, the strategy of always reporting −, though still a
Nash equilibrium, is not “activated” unless the prior probability of the B type
crosses a certain threshold. This behavior provides an important insight into the
influence of trusted reports: Trusted reports have a big impact on eliminating
individual lying strategies (the exponential decrease at the end of the interval
when only one of the constant reporting strategies is “active”). However, they
cannot simultaneously eliminate all of them.
For N = 3 the space of possible beliefs is two dimensional: two probabili-
ties entirely characterizes the prior distribution over the three types. Figure 3
presents three slices through the 3-dimensional graph for three different proba-
bilities of the type t1: p(t1) = 0.1, p(t1) = 0.3 and p(t1) = 0.5. The threshold
value q∗ varies between 0.5 and 0.8. Higher values characterize more focused
beliefs (i.e. beliefs that are highly focused around one type) while lower val-
ues characterize more ambiguous beliefs (i.e. beliefs for which the probability
distribution over types is more flat).
For higher number of types, the graphical representation of the space of
beliefs becomes impossible. Moreover, solving the optimization problem for an
increasing number of types (and therefore signals) becomes exponentially more
difficult. Instead of determining the threshold values for all possible beliefs, we
have concentrated on a smaller set of beliefs with increased practical importance.
For every N ∈ {4, 5, 6} we took all of the beliefs according to which the prior
probability of types is normally distributed around one of the types. The table in
Figure 4 summarizes the threshold values q∗ for the probability that the report
of the rater needs to be trusted.
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p(t1) = 0.5
Fig. 3. Threshold value q∗ for the MRZ mechanism, when N = 3 types, and δ = 10%.
Belief normally distributed around:
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
N = 4 0.664 0.539 0.539 0.664 - -
N = 5 0.675 0.734 0.734 0.734 0.750 -
N = 6 0.679 0.664 0.664 0.656 0.812 0.398
Fig. 4. Threshold value q∗ for the MRZ mechanism, when N ∈ {4, 5, 6} and δ = 10%.
All values have been produced using the global optimization solver BARON6
and the mathematical modelling language AIMMS7. For lack of computational
time, we couldn’t investigate the threshold values for settings with more than 6
types.
5 Related work
The formal study of reputation mechanisms was started by the three seminal
papers by Kreps, Wilson, Milgrom and Roberts ([13, 14, 12]) who proved that
cooperative equilibria can exist in finitely repeated games due to the reputation
effect. Ever since, reputation mechanisms have received an increasing amount of
interest, both from a practical and theoretical point of view.
Examples of computational trust mechanisms based on reputation are nu-
merous, ranging from mechanisms based on direct interactions (in [2] agents
learn to trust each other by keeping track of past interactions) to complex so-
cial networks [17] in which agents ask and give recommendations to their peers.
Centralized implementations as well as completely decentralized [1] have been
investigated.
One major challenge associated with designing reputation mechanisms is to
ensure that truthful reports are gathered about the actual outcome of the trans-
action. Besides the two solutions described in this paper, there have been a
couple of other incentive compatible mechanisms.
6 http://archimedes.scs.uiuc.edu/baron/baron.html
7 http://www.aimms.com
An interesting approach is that of Braynov and Sandholm in [3] and Del-
larocas in [6]. Instead of making it rational for the reporters to provide honest
feedback, the authors incentivize the service providers to truthfully declare their
trustworthiness (or reputation).
[3] considers exchanges of goods for money and proves that a market in
which agents are trusted to the degree they deserve to be trusted is equally
efficient as a market with complete trustworthiness. By scaling the amount of
the traded product, the authors prove that it is possible to make it rational for
sellers to truthfully declare their trustworthiness. Truthful declaration of one’s
trustworthiness eliminates the need of reputation mechanisms and significantly
reduces the cost of trust management.
For e-Bay-like auctions, the Goodwill Hunting mechanism [6] provides a way
to make the sellers indifferent between lying or truthfully declaring the quality
of the good offered for sale. Momentary gains or losses obtained from misrepre-
senting the good’s quality are later compensated by the mechanism which has
the power to modify the announcement of the seller.
Finally, Jurca and Faltings [11] take a different approach and achieve in
equilibrium truthful reporting by comparing the two reports coming from the
buyer and the seller involved in the same transaction.
This paper also relates to the vast literature concerned with computing Nash
equilibrium strategies. [4] gives a nice overview of the available results in this
field and proves some complexity results which are of direct relevance to the
present paper.
Last, but not least, this work relates to the ongoing efforts of the networking
community to design routing algorithms that have a unique Nash equilibrium
point with the desired properties.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the influence of trusted reports on the set of Nash
equilibria of two well-established incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms.
We emphasize the problem such mechanisms have with non-incentive compati-
ble Nash equilibrium strategies, and investigate how such undesired equilibrium
points can be eliminated. By using trusted reports to rate the honesty of feedback
submitted by rational agents we show that it is possible to have a mechanism in
which the incentive compatible strategy is the only (or the most likely) strategy
to be followed.
A numerical analysis provides values for the minimum probability that the
report of the rater needs to be trusted. For the JF mechanism, this thresh-
old value can be smaller; it corresponds, however, to the overall percentage of
trusted reports needed by the mechanism. The MRZ mechanism requires a higher
threshold values, but on the other hand allows the reuse of trusted reports.
Besides the numerical analysis of the two reputation mechanisms we also
provide a general methodology for eliminating undesired equilibrium points from
incentive compatible reputation mechanisms.
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